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Abstract 
The availability of credit to entrepreneurs with good investment opportunities is an important 
facilitator of economic growth. Under normal economic conditions most entrepreneurs who 
requested loans receive them. In a global financial crisis, popular opinion is that banks are 
severely restricting lending to smaller businesses. This assumes that low levels of investment 
are caused by supply-side restrictions in the credit market. Little is said about potential changes 
in the demand for credit and how it is influenced by entrepreneurs’ perceptions about supply-
side restrictions. One particularly interesting, and under-researched, group of small businesses 
are those who have potentially good investment opportunities, but are discouraged from 
applying for external funding as they fear rejection. In this study, we question whether these 
entrepreneurs were correct in their assumptions. We find that levels of discouragement are 
quite low in general at 2.7% of the total smaller business population. Further analysis implies 
that 55.6% of discouraged borrowers would have got loans had they applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1. Introduction 
“Small firms are vital to the U.S. economy. According to the U.S. Small Business 
Administration, they account for half of all U.S. private-sector employment and produced more 
than 60% of net job growth in the U.S. between 1993 and 2008. Therefore, a better understanding 
of who needs credit and who gets credit can help policymakers to take actions that will lead to 
more jobs and faster economic growth.”  
Cole, R and Sokolyk, T (2015)  
The availability of credit to entrepreneurs with good investment opportunities is an 
important facilitator of economic growth and firm-level competition (Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2006; Marlow and Patton, 2005). In a severe global financial crisis, with its roots in the 
banking sector, popular opinion is that banks are severely restricting lending to viable smaller 
businesses and that this is increasing their probability of failure and decreasing their potential 
to invest in future growth. This assumes that low levels of investment are caused by supply-
side restrictions in the credit market, and this focus is mirrored in formal theories of credit 
rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Blinder, 1987) and in government responses to perceived 
credit rationing in alternative form of supporting schemes such as direct public subsidies 
(Colombo et al., 2011), loan guarantee programmes (Cowling, 2010) and government-co-
sponsored or managed venture capital funds (Cumming et al., 2014; Grilli and Murtinu, 2014, 
2015). However, little is said about potential changes in the demand for credit when a global 
financial crisis occurs, in this case from September 2008.  
One particularly interesting, and under-researched, group of small businesses are those 
who have potentially good investment opportunities, but are discouraged from applying for 
external funding as they fear rejection – so called “discouraged borrowers”. Discouraged 
borrower estimates, expressed as a share of the total small business stock, range from 0.51% 
in Canada (Chandler, 2010), 8.75-14.04% in the US (Cole, 2009; Han et al., 2009), 8.1% in the 
  
UK (Freel et al, 2012), 22.3% in France (Cieply and Dejardin, 2009), to 44.36% in Pakistan 
(Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013). To put these numbers in context, and using the US as an 
example, there are 25 million sole proprietors and partnerships. The median loan size (using 
figures from the 1998 US survey of small business finance) is $50,000. This would suggest 
that potentially $109-$176bn of loans could have been made. Of course not all discouraged 
entrepreneurs would have a viable investment proposal, but even if just 10% of discouraged 
borrowers in the US had good investment potential, the absolute dollar numbers are substantial. 
On this basis, discouraged borrowers merit further research attention, particularly in the context 
of an economic recession when we might, a priori, expect discouragement to be at its highest. 
But our contribution to developing our understanding of this discouraged borrower 
phenomenon is wider than this as we explore the potential explanations for entrepreneurs 
becoming discouraged and how their expectations about banks' willingness to supply credit are 
formed and shape their decisions not to apply. This provides the empirical context and basis 
for our work. Next we focus on our theoretical contribution. 
It is widely accepted that small firms usually have to rely on the external credit market to 
fund potentially viable investment opportunities (Gelos and Werner, 2002; Laeven, 2003; 
Love, 2003) when internal funds are insufficient to meet the firm’s investment needs (Vanacker 
and Manigart, 2010) and the most common source of external funding is commercial (high 
street) banks (Colombo and Grilli, 2007; de Bettignies and Brander, 2007; La Rocca et al, 
2011). Although most large businesses that apply for external credit are successful as they 
benefit from their sheer size and longevity, this is not the case for many small businesses (Cosh 
et al, 2009; Fraser, 2014; Fairlie and Robb, 2007; Levenson and Willard, 2000; Shen, 2002). 
Lack of assets to place as security against lending is a significant problem for many small 
businesses (Cowling, 1999; Coco, 2000), and this is related to a wider lack of information 
transparency and the potential for moral hazard and adverse selection to be present in the 
  
market. Further, incomplete ownership and management teams and a resultant inability to 
identify high quality projects from a pool of potential investments all add risk and uncertainty 
to the banks lending decision. It is also the case that small businesses are more vulnerable to 
unanticipated exogenous factors such as a Global Financial Crisis (GFC).  
Scholars and governments have been concerned for decades that there is a significant 
minority of smaller business that are unable to access bank loans for reasons unrelated to their 
quality. This is central to the original work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), which inspired  a 
voluminous empirical literature that sought to establish whether genuine credit rationing of 
high quality investment proposals was a real-world issue in the smaller business credit market 
(Cowling and Mitchell, 2003; Fraser, 2009). This empirical evidence was then used to establish 
a rationale for subsequent government intervention in credit markets typically through partial 
credit (loan) guarantee programmes (Cowling and Clay, 1994; Cowling, 2010; Riding, 1997). 
However, despite their credit-worthiness, some firms with a latent demand for credit choose 
not to apply for credit because the cost of application is too high (Kon and Storey, 2003). Here 
we can relate application costs to the time and money spent by the entrepreneur in preparing 
their financial accounts, revenue forecasts and generally assembling the relevant information 
to assist in developing their business plans. And, particularly for young and relatively 
inexperienced entrepreneurs, these are not trivial investments in time and money. 
This unwillingness of some entrepreneurs to even apply for credit has implications for 
banks (suppliers of credit) and entrepreneurs (demanders of credit), and for the wider economy. 
In line with classic credit rationing theories, when loans are not forthcoming to entrepreneurs 
with viable investment opportunities then lending is at a sub-optimal level and banks suffer 
from lower profit, some of which could be used for future lending. But on the demand-side, 
when entrepreneurs with viable investment opportunities do not apply for loans which they 
would have received, then there is a sub-optimal level of investment (under-investment) from 
  
the entrepreneurial sector (Vermoesen et al, 2013), and this can result in lower returns to 
entrepreneurial ability (human capital) at the micro level and lower rates of innovation, fewer 
jobs created, and generally lower levels of economic growth at the macro level. Moreover, 
banks would use debt as a monitoring device which effectively adds disciplane to the managers 
of the firm, and thus influence firm performance in a indirect (but positive) way (Jensen, 1986; 
Colombo et al., 2014).  
As the GFC was a unique, and unanticipated, economic shock, and impacted on the entire 
global banking system, it provides us with an equally unique context in which we can examine 
how the market for small business credit reacted when the UK economy entered the GFC since 
September 2008. Previous research (Lown and Morgan, 2006) established that changes in 
banks credit standards (non-price loan contract features) played a key role in shaping the 
willingness of banks to advance credit in the future. Specifically, they found that there was an 
inverse relationship between the credit cycle and the business cycle in terms of the willingness 
of banks to supply of loans. Other research (Hanousek and Filer, 2004) suggested that the way 
in which banks determine their credit allocation (supply of loans) is the main reason why credit 
rationing will always be a feature of small business credit markets. They argued that banks 
effectively take strategic decisions to allocate loan funds to industries (rather than firms) where 
expected future investment returns are highest. Implicitly, a good small business in the ‘wrong’ 
industry will be unfairly credit rationed. 
We are drawn to conclude that whilst there is a considerable volume of theoretical and 
empirical literature which considers many aspects of credit rationing, there is much less focus, 
and evidence, on the unique context of a GFC. This latter issue is perhaps not surprising as 
they occur at this magnitude very infrequently. We hope to contribute to this relative gap in 
our knowledge by establishing empirically what did happen to UK small business credit 
markets in the GFC. And we are able to review outcomes from the supply side in respect of 
  
banks willingness to advance credit and who to, and from the demand side of the market. The 
demand-side is relatively ignored by public policy-makers, but we are able to identify what 
types of smaller businesses continue to request credit and who is deterred from making a credit 
application. Both of these issues are potentially important, as the preparation of a funding 
application is not trivial either in time or cash. By focusing on the demand for credit from 
entrepreneurs to banks we allow their decisions to be impacted upon by their perceptions about 
the willingness of banks to advance credit which is a noisy and imperfect signal. This is beyond 
traditional credit rationing theories which have at their heart information-based problems which 
prevent banks from assigning the true risk to each potential small business application for 
funding. 
To investigate the importance of this discouraged borrower phenomenon, we begin by 
quantifying the level of discouragement amongst UK small businesses. We then question 
whether these discouraged entrepreneurs were correct in their assumptions about being rejected 
for loans and draw out the potential implications of this for the UK economy or whether they 
are misreading the extent to which banks are reducing credit availability. We use a unique set 
of data drawn from the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) 7 SME Business 
Barometer Surveys. The surveys were carried out from December 2008 to February 2010 at 2-
3 monthly intervals over the course of the current recession, which officially began in 
September 2008, amongst small businesses in the UK. To benchmark our recession based 
analysis, we estimate an identical set of models using the UK SME Financing Survey for 2004 
(a period of modest economic growth and general macroeconomic stability).  
We estimate a sequential set of conditional probit regression models where a firm with 
financing needs first decides whether or not to apply for a loan, and then considers the outcome 
of the application conditional on a firm applying for a loan. As this is the first study to examine 
this phenomenon using UK data covering the entire economic recession and benchmarking this 
  
against the evidence from a year of stable and modest economic growth, our results will 
complement previous empirical work in this area as well as provide important evidence to 
support UK policy-making regarding small business financing. It will also help banks in 
developing their lending processes. 
Our findings are that levels of discouragement in a stable economy are very low and rise 
during an economic recession. Even during recession they are quite low in general, but higher 
amongst experienced entrepreneurs. However, failure rates for loan requests are high with 
between 30 and 40% of total loan requests being turned down. This suggests that more 
experienced entrepreneurs are making rational decisions given the prevailing economic 
climate. Further analysis implies that 55.6% of discouraged borrowers would have got loans 
had they applied. Regarding credit supply, the key finding is that the financial crisis added 
noise and uncertainty to the lending market and banks responded by placing much more 
emphasis on relationships when making their loan decisions. But entrepreneurs also appear to 
have over-estimated the extent to which banks’ willingness to advance loans had contracted. 
Rough estimates suggest that the scale of under-investment could be in the region of £1.5bn 
per annum over the recessionary cycle. 
The paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the theoretical background and previous 
empirical evidence from which we formulate the main hypotheses. Section 3 presents the 
dataset and the variables, in particular our measure of credit discouragement. Section 4 reports 
the results from the empirical analyses. Finally, Section 5 discusses our findinds and concludes 
the paper. 
2. Loan applications and discouragement: theories and empirical evidence 
The subject of credit rationing itself has been the focus of a considerable body of 
theoretical work for a long period of time (Keeton, 1979; Thakor, 1989). The notion of credit 
rationing stems from the puzzle that in a competitive market, banks would refuse to lend to 
  
some firms rather than raise loan price (the interest rate) when there is an excess demand for 
bank funds (Cowling,1997; Fairlie and Robb, 2007; Fraser, 2009; Levenson and Willard, 2000; 
Shen, 2002). The common thread that ties much of the literature together is the role that 
information plays in the small firm-bank relationship (Behr and Guttler, 2007; Berger and Udell, 
1998; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Adverse selection and moral hazard resulted from asymmetric 
information between firms and banks lead to a supply of investment capital below the social 
optimum (de Meza and Southey, 1996; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 and 1983). 
However, as previously identified, the issue of discouraged borrowers has only recently 
become a focus of research attention amongst academics and policy-makers since the formal 
theory of discouraged borrowers set out by Kon and Storey (2003). Building on the general 
credit rationing theories, Kon and Storey (2003) develop a theory explicitly to explain why 
discouraged borrowers exist. At the heart of their theory, as with general credit rationing 
theory’s, is unobservable borrower quality (asymmetric information). Extended from a 
standard adverse selection model, the model of discouraged borrowers suggests that a firm, 
regardless of its quality, will apply for a loan only if an investment project yields a return 
greater than the ‘effective borrowing cost’. The most important determinants of the effective 
borrowing cost are the monetary cost of the application and the bank’s screening error (the 
probability that a good firm is mistakenly perceived as a bad firm by the bank or vice versa), 
both arising from information asymmetries. 
Under perfect information (i.e. no screening error), every (good) firm would apply and 
get the loan successfully so there will be no discouragement. However, under imperfect 
information, some firms may incur such a high effective application cost that the return is no 
longer sufficient to cover the cost of borrowing. Here, screening error plays an important role 
in determining discouragement in the sense that it increases (decreases) discouragement by 
  
good (bad) firms. Therefore, an effective screening device would be the case where only bad 
firms are discouraged from applying for loans. 
The source of variation in loan application cost can be both physical and psychological. 
The former is fundamentally associated with lenders’ response to risk, or information 
transparency. For example, size of firm is often taken to be a good proxy for firm risk and 
resource availability (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006), as is age of firm (Cowling, 1999; Chua 
et al., 2011). Indeed, Serrasqueiro and Nunes (2011) show that age of firm is particularly 
relevant in determining the capital structure decisions of small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). Empirical evidence from a study of 47,115 Finnish firms reported by Hyytinnen and 
Pajarinen (2007) finds that when a small business ages one year, its’ cost of debt decreases by 
1-2 basis points.  
Information transparency reduces screening error and can be improved by the use of 
business credit lines (Cole, 2009; Han et al., 2009; Peterson and Rajan, 2002) or longer/better 
firm-bank relationships (Berger and Udell, 1995; Peterson and Rajan, 1995). Both measures 
could improve the availability of information thus lower the cost of application. Entrepreneurial 
experience is also helpful in reducing information opacity between lenders and borrowers (Kon 
and Storey, 2003), thus may a priori lead to lower discouragement. However, from a demand-
side perspective, such measures could also help borrowers identify the negative shock in the 
credit supply compared to non-recessionary periods. For example, a borrower with previous 
experience in economic downturns would adjust her ex ante perceptions on loan rejection rates 
upward, and therefore become more discouraged during the financial crisis. In accordance with 
this discussion and if discouragement is an efficient self-rationing mechanism, we have the 
following two hypotheses: 
H1: Discouragement is more likely to be concentrated in smaller and younger firms. 
  
H2: Measures that facilitate bilateral information flows between firms and banks reduce 
the likelihood of discouragement.  
Whilst the outcome of loan applications is generally dependent on risk indicators used by 
banks such as size, age and entrepreneur human capital (e.g. Cassar, 2004; Cosh et al, 2009; 
Cowling et al., 2011; Colombo and Grill, 2010), we predict that during an economic recession 
these relationships will become less apparent or even disappear. With credit rationing at the 
heart of the recession, firms that are able to successfully secure finance will have to perform 
better than would be the case in a more stable economic environment. In a recessionary 
environment, when the flow of potential opportunities diminishes and the supply of loan 
contracts, only the best firms are able to take advantage of any remaining business opportunities 
(Acs and Storey, 2004; Grilli, 2010) and apply for external finance. Therefore lending 
institutions are more likely to use measures that reduce information opacity, such as 
longer/better firm-bank relationships, when examining loan applications.    
H3: Banks will increasingly defer to using a smaller set of borrower risk indicators that 
improve information transparency, such as longer/better firm-bank relationships in a 
recessionary environment. 
Whilst the evidence is not directly comparable in many cases, levels of discouragement 
are clearly not insignificant and appear of a broadly similar magnitude to actual loan rejection 
rates. The economic importance of discouragement is that it leads to direct financial constraints 
on smaller businesses, and this can lead to a postponement or abandonment of planned 
investment activities. However it should be noted that discouragement will not a priori lead to 
financial constraints. Informed financiers screening firms that are not commercially attractive 
out of the loan market may actually be a rational behaviour indicating an efficient market (Kon 
and Storey, 2003; Revest and Sapio, 2012). 
  
Empirically, researchers have sought to find suitable proxies which capture aspects of 
information flows and transparency. For example, Han et al. (2009) and Cole (2013) followed 
the Petersen and Rajan (2002) methodology in using lines of credit (commitment loans) and 
use of business credit cards as measures of bilateral information flows between firms and their 
banks. In both cases banks a priori assess the ‘creditworthiness’ of potential borrowers to set 
the upper limit on available credit. Le and Nguyen (2009) argue that networking and social 
capital increase the use of bank loans. Chua et al. (2011) find that being able to ‘borrow’ social 
capital from family involvement improves a new venture's access to debt financing. 
Developing their work on (reducing) information asymmetries, Petersen and Rajan (2002) also 
bring length of the firms relationship with their bank into the equation. This variable was 
adopted by Han et al. (2009), Chakravarty and Xiang (2010), Chandler (2010), Cieply and 
Dejardin (2010) and Cole (2013) in their respective empirical studies. Developments in 
information technology, specifically online banking, have also changed the physical and 
psychological distance in the firm-bank relationship (Rao, 2004). And this development has 
facilitated, if not necessitated, the use of standardised means of evaluating credit applications 
which, as was the case with commitment lending and credit cards, improved the flow of 
information between firms and their banks, and reduced the marginal cost of processing loan 
applications. In line with this, studies using the US Surveys of Small Business Finance data 
sets incorporate a variable indicating whether or not a firm uses internet banking facilities. This 
standardisation of loan evaluation processes also appears to have reduced the relative effect of 
gender as a factor in determining (a) loan application rates (Alsos et al., 2006), and (b) loan 
approval rates (Carter et al., 2007; Orser et al., 2006). Freel et al (2012) include firm strategy 
variables as risk indicators in their study of credit discouragement in the UK but the results are 
far from conclusive. 
"Insert Table 1 Here" 
  
From Table 1 we observe that there is not a great deal of empirical support for many of 
the key predictions from theory in our unique context of the GFC. The most consistent 
relationships are the negative effect of firm size and length of relationship on levels of 
discouragement. Here smaller firms are the most likely to be discouraged, as are those with the 
shortest relationships with their financiers. This evidence lends support to the theory that 
relationships with financiers reduce information asymmetries and lead to lower levels of 
discouragement. 
3. Method 
3.1. Data 
This study is intended to analyse existing data from seven ‘Business Barometer’ surveys 
conducted by BIS which cover information of small businesses during the latest recession. 
The firms interviewed in the ‘Business Barometer’ surveys are a sub-sample of the 
2007/08 UK Annual Small Business Survey (ASBS). The ASBS survey is a large-scale 
telephone-based survey conducted to monitor key trends in the characteristics and perceptions 
of UK small business owners and managers among all industry sectors and regions. It has been 
conducted on an annual basis since 2003. 3,506 out of the 19,188 2007/08 ASBS sample firms 
were re-contacted to determine how well or badly they have performed in the previous year, 
and to assess their levels of business confidence going forward. On average 500 SMEs were 
re-surveyed using questions similar to the 2007/08 ASBS in each of the seven ‘Business 
Barometer’ waves (no firm participated in multiple surveys), starting from December 2008 to 
February 2010 with intervals of two to three months. The survey period coincides with the 
latest financial crisis therefore gives us the opportunity to investigate how business attitudes 
and access to finance by UK SMEs change during the recession.  
We undertook a one-to-one merge of the ‘Business Barometer’ data with the ASBS 07/08 
data, which result in a data set of 3,506 SMEs with no loss of data from the merge. After 
  
eliminating missing data, we have 3,089 firm-level observations in our sample. Whilst the 
weighting system allows for the sample in each wave to be representative of the UK business 
population, it is not able to fully address the issue of firm exit per se on an individual basis and 
this introduces the potential for survivorship bias in our sample. Statistics for the UK suggest 
that in the region of 2.5% of the stock of firms will exit through various means on a quarterly 
basis. 
3.2. Dependent variables 
Four classifications of small business borrowers are identified to examine the 
determinants of discouragement and the difference between discouraged and other borrowers. 
The classifications are illustrated in Figure 1. 
"Insert Figure 1 Here" 
The ‘Business Barometer’ asked (i) whether a firm applied for finance during the last 12 
months and (ii) if not, the reason(s) why. A ‘non-borrower’ is the firm who did not apply for a 
loan because the firm did not need credit (no demand). For all borrowers, a discouraged 
borrower is defined as one with demand for but not applying for any finance either because the 
firm feared rejection, or the owner thought the finance was too expensive. Those that applied 
for finance (applicants) either succeeded (approved) or not (denied).  
3.3. Explanatory variables 
Independent variables in this study can be classified into four groups: firm characteristics, 
owner/entrepreneur characteristics, information and market related variables and recessionary 
time indicators. Table 2 defines the explanatory variables by these four groups. 
The main firm characteristics include size, age, sector, region and performance. Firm size 
is measured by employee numbers (EMP). Age is given by ‘Business Barometer’ surveys as 
banded variables (up to 10 years, 11 to 20 years and more than 20 years). Performance is 
measured banded sales change over the past 12 months (increased, same or decreased) and 
  
whether or not the firm has made a profit over the period (PROFIT). Further, the sample covers 
small firms across the UK (in 12 regions) and 8 industry sectors. Further we control for firm 
innovation (INNOVATION) and whether or not the firm is in a high-technology sector (HIGH-
TECH). Both types of firms are subject to higher agency cost and information asymmetry given 
their reliance on intangible assets (Mina et al., 2013) and the higher uncertainty associated with 
innovation (Coad and Rao, 2008; Mazzucato,2013). 
Owner/entrepreneur characteristics measure the firm’s human and social capital including 
gender (WLED), prior experiences (EXP) and education (UNIVERSITY) and measures on 
entrepreneurial orientation. An experienced employer is defined as having previously set up a 
business, charity or been self-employed. The entrepreneurial orientation of firm owners is used 
as the exclusion restrictions in our conditional analyses as they are obviously unobservable by 
banks but found to be significant in explaining the demand for finance (Michaelas et al., 1999; 
Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2008). Here we define entrepreneur orientation as a dummy variable 
(AIMGROW) equal to 1 if the owner aims to grow the business in the next two to three years 
and 0 otherwise.  
Information and market related variables proxy for the information transparency between 
firms and financiers, as well as entrepreneurs’ perception on market conditions. Use of internet 
banking (IBANKING) is an indicator of loan application costs (Han et al., 2009). Firm-lender 
(bank) relationship plays a crucial role in both credit demand and supply, which is negatively 
related to the information asymmetry between informationally opaque small business 
borrowers and lenders. Here, firm-bank relationship is measured as either bad (RELATION_0), 
neutral (RELATION_1), or good (RELATION_2) according to survey respondents. Besides the 
above direct measures of information transparency, we also use variables that are indirectly 
linked to information opacity, i.e. a firm’s credit history (MISS_1, MISS_2, MISS_3 and 
NOMISS), defined as the number of times a credit payment has been delayed; and previous 
  
finance-seeking activities (PSF), defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has 
previously sought external finance and 0 otherwise.  
4. Results 
This section first reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables, followed by the results from regression analyses. To take into account the obvious 
conditionality of credit demand and supply (as shown in Figure 1), probit models with selection 
(Van de Ven and Van Pragg, 1981) are used in all our regressions. In this way, entrepreneurs 
in need of finance first decide whether or not to apply for a loan and, if yes, their applications 
may be subsequently approved or rejected. Standard model diagnostics are reported for each 
specification. Further, we also conducted additional tests on the exclusion restrictions to verify 
their exogeneity, i.e. validity, and that they are not weakly correlated to the first-stage selection 
equations (weak instruments). The details of the additional test and model diagnostics are 
reported in the Appendix. 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the variable definitions and descriptive statistics for discouraged 
borrowers, all applicants, approved and denied applicants, as well as univariate mean-
comparison test results between these 4 groups of small businesses. We have identified 82 
discouraged borrowers between December 2008 and February 2010, along with 721 applicants, 
from which 503 firms (70%) were granted finance and 218 firms were denied (30%) finance. 
Discouraged borrowers represent 2.65% of the total small business population, which is higher 
than Canada (0.51%), Chandler, 2010), but lower than other countries (8.75-14.04% in the US 
by Cole, 2009 and Han et al., 2009; 22.3% in France by Cieply and Dejardin, 2009; 44.36% in 
Pakistan by Chakravarty and Xiang, 2010). In a similar study in the UK using data from a 
survey in 2005 (Freel et al, 2012), the level of discouragement is much higher at 8.1%. 
  
For the whole sample of 3,089 SMEs (Results not reported but available from the authors 
upon request), an ‘typical’ firm is an urban-located, family-owned business, and experienced 
falling sales during the last year. The average firm is owned by a white male entrepreneur who 
has no prior experience in running a business. Small business requiring funds (discouraged 
borrowers plus applicants) consist of 26% of all SMEs (803 firms), and compared to the non-
borrowing firms, are larger (37 employees) but younger, slightly less likely to be in an urban 
area but more likely to be family-owned. 
Univariate testing allows a preliminary comparison of different types of borrowers. On 
average, discouraged borrowers are younger, smaller and poorer performing, even compared 
to firms that were denied finance. Here, the average difference in employment is 24 employees 
between discouraged borrowers and applicants. Regarding owner characteristics, discouraged 
borrowers tend to be more experienced than denied applicants.  
In terms of borrower risk indicators, discouraged borrowers are more likely to have 
previously sought finance. On average, discouraged borrowers are more likely to have better 
relationships with lenders than those being denied finance, but their firm-bank relationship is 
generally worse than approved applicants. The unfavorable firm-bank relationship for 
discouraged borrowers is closely related to their poor credit history as discouraged firms are 
most likely to have missed loan/overdraft payments multiple times (MISS_3) compared to the 
other 3 groups.  
The last column of Table 2 compares firms that were eventually approved and denied 
finance by banks. It can be seen that firms that were denied finance are similar to discouraged 
borrowers in terms of firm characteristics, implying that discouragement is an efficient self-
rationing mechanism to screen riskier borrowers from the loan market. However, the 
differences are much smaller than those between discouraged and approved applicants. The 
most prominent difference between approved and denied applicants lies within firm-bank 
  
relationships (as well as credit history). Firms that were denied finance have much poorer 
relationships with banks.  
"Insert Table 2 Here" 
We also look at the distribution of discouragement over time during the recent financial 
crisis and this time dynamic of credit demand and supply is shown in Figure 2. No 
discouragement happened for firms surveyed in February and June 2009 and only 1% of SMEs 
reported discouragement in April 2009. In order to increase our sample size, these three groups 
of firms are aggregated using a single dummy variable (WAVE2/3/4). It can be seen that 
discouragement was more likely to happen at the very beginning (December 2008) and towards 
the end of the recession especially in December 2009, when 35% of all discouragement during 
the recession occurred. 
“Insert Figure 2 Here” 
4.2. Benchmark regressions 
As benchmark analyses, non-recessionary demand for and supply of finance are examined 
using the 2004 Survey of SME Financing and variables are defined in similar ways as in the 
within-recession ASBS analyses. In sharp contrast with the recessionary figures, of the 2,254 
sample small businesses only 0.6% (13 SMEs) of total sample are identified as discouraged 
borrowers, and the majority (95%) of loan applications were approved. Table 3 reports the 
regression results for non-recessionary conditional credit demand and supply. In both cases, 
the 2 tests of independent equations are rejected at 1% level, justifying the presence of 
selection bias in an unconditional model. 
Model 1 looks at the decision of a firm with financing need whether to apply for the 
finance or not. Firm owner’s perception on the severity of financing problems (scaled from 1 
(no problem) to 10 (critical problem)) is used as the exclusion restriction for the selection 
equation, given the expectation that more severe financing problem would increase the demand 
  
for finance but the application decision is based on the firm’s perception on credit supply. 
Consistent with our prediction, larger and older firms are significantly less likely to be 
discouraged. Here a one person increase in employment reduces the probability of 
discouragement by 0.05% (p < .01) and firms more than 20 year’s old are on average 2.7% (p 
< .10) less likely to be discouraged.  
Regarding owner/entrepreneur characteristics, entrepreneurs with university degrees are 
1.8% (p < .05) less likely to be discouraged. However, experienced entrepreneurs and firms 
with a good relationship with lending banks are just as likely as others to be discouraged in a 
non-recessionary environment. These findings indicate that in ‘normal’ times when economic 
conditions are in general favourable and there are fewer restrictions on credit supply, 
information transparency does not play an important role in screening good from bad firms 
before they apply for any finance.  
Model 2 reports the coefficient estimates for the conditional supply of finance in a non-
recessionary period. In addition to the exclusive restritions used in Model 1, entrepreneurial 
experience is used as an additional restriction as it is not easily observable by finance providers. 
It is found that applications by larger and thus less risky firms are significantly less likely to be 
turned down. Information transparency is a particularly important determinant of credit supply 
in non-recessionary periods. Firms that managed to fill the information gaps with banks 
through relationship-building are significantly less likely to be denied finance. Therefore, 
during non-recessionary periods, banks tend to use a wider range of criteria and seem to have 
made a more detailed screening based on both the riskiness of the firm and the knowledge 
gained from past business relationships with the applicants. An interesting finding was that 
geographic region did not appear to be associated with different outcomes. This might imply 
that the four dominant UK banks operated a national policy regarding small business lending 
and this was well understood by firms across the UK.  
  
"Insert Table 3 Here" 
4.3. Conditional credit discouragement during the recession 
Model 1 of Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates for the probability of a firm applying 
for finance conditional on the firm demanding external fund. Sector, entrepreneurs growth 
orientations and previous finance seeking activities are used as the exclusion restrictions for 
the regressions, because they are found to be significantly associated with credit demand but 
not discouragement (in single-equation probit models). Intuitively, growth orientations are 
unobservable by banks and found to be significant in explaining the demand for finance 
(Michaelas et al., 1999; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2008). The 2 test of independent equations is 
rejected at 1% level so the model is appropriately specified.  
Similar to the non-recessionary results, smaller and younger firms are more likely to be 
discouraged. On average, a one person increase in employment increases the probability of 
applying by 0.1% (p < .05), and firms more than 20 years old are 5.6% (p < .1)more likely to 
apply for finance than younger firms. All these findings are consistent with our conjecture that 
safer (i.e. larger, older) firms appear to have lower applications costs thus are less likely to be 
discouraged. 
Compared to non-recessionary periods, we predict that in a financial crisis information 
transparency plays a more important role in firm’s loan application decision making. More 
experienced and better educated entrepreneurs are 25% (p < .1) and 5.5% (p < .01) less likely 
to apply for finance, respectively, even if they need it. This indicates informational 
disadvantage is indeed on the demand-side, that more experienced hence more ‘realistic’ 
entrepreneurs (Cavalluzzo, et al., 2002) have realised the difficulties in access to finance during 
recessionary periods, so they voluntarily impose self-control on their borrowing activities. This 
is unlikely to be a result of experienced entrepreneurs having access to alternative sources of 
  
finance (e.g. equity) as only 1.3% of experienced entrepreneurs sought equity finance and none 
of them issued shares to new investors (1.7% of all firms sought equity finance). 
Riskier firms in terms of poor credit history are also more likely to be discouraged. Here, 
firms that have missed loan/overdraft payments for over 3 times are 6% more likely to be 
discouraged (p < .01). Variables associated with the magnitude of information gap between 
firms and banks, such as good borrower-bank relationships are also more important as 
compared to non-recessionary periods. Here the probability of applying finance increases by 
3% (p < .01) if the firm has a good relationship with the banks. Discouragement is most likely 
to be observed at the beginning of the crisis. Compared to SMEs surveyed in December 2008, 
those interviewed one year later were 25% (p < .01) more likely to apply for finance.  
"Insert Table 4 Here" 
4.4. Conditional supply of funds during the recession 
The comparison between the conditional loan application and approval functions shows 
important differences regarding the types of firms that are likely to be discouraged and denied 
(Models 2 and 3, Table 4). Model 2 uses the same probit model with selections as Model 1, 
where the probability of a loan being denied is conditional on a firm applying for finance. The 
model is properly identified as the 2 test of independent equations is rejected at 10% level. 
Entrepreneurial experience and growth-orientation are used as exclusive restrictions because 
they are more difficult to be quantified by the banks when making lending decisions. As shown 
in the Appendix, the null hypothesis that all the exclusion restrictions are weak instruments 
cannot be rejected, although the validity of the instruments is verified by the Sargan test statistic, 
which calls on further analyses as robustness checks. 
As shown in Model 2, almost all the firm characteristics that are significant in determining 
discouragement have lost their explanatory powers to predict loan approval, including firm size. 
Compared to pre-recession results, it appears that banks in recessionary periods tend to base 
  
their lending decisions exclusively on firm-bank relationships and business credit history. On 
average and compare to firms with poor firm-bank relationships, neutral and good relationships 
decrease the odds of loan denial by 15.8% (p < .01) and 38.7% (p < .01), respectively.  
Since further tests cast questions on the inference and relevance of the exclusion 
restrictions, unconditional model is used as robustness checks to compare the riskiness of 
different types of firms in our context. Model 3 reports the results for the multinomial logit 
regression for discouraged, approved and denied borrowers using discouraged borrower as the 
base case. In terms of riskiness, discouraged borrowers are the riskiest even compared to denied 
borrowers, where denied borrowers are of larger size ( = 0.02, p < .01). However, in terms of 
entrepreneurial education, and thus the perceptions on the degree of credit rationing, both 
approved ( = -0.70, p < .05) and denied ( = -0.57, p < .1) applicants are significantly less 
educated than discouraged borrowers. Consistent with the findings from Model 2, denied 
borrowers have the worst firm-bank relationships, where they are least likely to have a good 
relationship with the banks ( = -0.75, p < .05). As a robustness check,  we also considered 
alternative exclusion restrictions in both the conditional credit application and denial equations. 
Whilst they do not materially affect the results reported in Table 4, alternative specifications 
are available upon request. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
5.1. Implications of Research Findings 
Our starting point was that certain types of entrepreneurs perceived that their chances of 
successfully securing a bank loan were so low that the costs of making an application were not 
worthwhile. This group of entrepreneurs are called ‘discouraged borrowers’ and previous work 
suggested that they were a quantifiably important subset of the small business sector. We 
predicted that this phenomenon would be even more prevalent during the worlds’ deepest 
  
financial crisis for seventy years. Using a unique UK data set covering the entire economic 
recession, our results show that discouraged borrowers are a relatively small subset of the 
smaller business sector, and even in a deep economic recession represent only 2.65% of the 
total stock, which equates to 30,000 firms out of a total stock of 1.2 million smaller businesses. 
However the percentage of discouraged borrowers is still significantly larger than non-
recessionary periods (0.6% versus 2.65%).  
We then sought to establish whether discouraged borrowers were different from 
entrepreneurs willing to apply for loans. Our results are in line with previous empirical 
evidence from the US (Han et al., 2009) and Canada (Chandler, 2010) that discouragement is 
an efficient self-rationing mechanism even during an economic recession. Discouraged 
borrowers are generally smaller and younger which is consistent with informational theories of 
credit rationing. However contrary to the traditional credit discouragement theory based on 
supply-side information asymmetry (Kon & Storey, 2003), we found that more experienced 
entrepreneurs are more likely to be discouraged holding other factors constant. This suggests 
that entrepreneurs who have experienced previous economic recessions have learnt about bank 
lending behaviour when the market demand is falling, and anticipate that credit rationing will 
increase thus reducing the availability of credit in general. In this sense experienced 
entrepreneurs are acting in a rational manner by self-adjusting their borrowing activities. We 
also argue that information transparency can be proxied by better firm-bank relationships and 
predict that discouragement will be lower for firms with good relationships with banks. We 
find strong empirical support for this conjecture, suggesting that a good firm-bank relationship 
does substantially facilitate the information flows between borrowers and lenders. 
If discouragement is an efficient self-rationing mechanism through which low-quality 
firms voluntarily choose not to enter the loan market, discouraged borrowers should be as risky 
as, or even riskier than, denied borrowers but should be better informed of firm quality and 
  
credit supply in the loan market. We find strong support for this hypothesis through our 
empirical analyses. When comparing discouraged, approved and denied borrowers, 
discouraged borrowers have the smallest firm size and poorest growth performance, yet they 
are the most experienced even compared to firms that have successfully secured finance.  
Our findings also suggest that the degree of information asymmetry also exits in the 
banking sector in terms of credit supply in the financial crisis. On the supply-side and especially 
during an economic downturn, when the information flow on the small business sector is 
further hampered by market turbulence, banks have found themselves unable to distinguish 
high and low quality firms through common risk indicators such as size, age or performance. 
The only source of information banks can rely on is from previous relationships and they tend 
to provide finance to whomever with a good relationship with the banks. 
The policy implications of our results are twofold. First, small business policy should not 
be targeted at discouraged borrowers. They are, in many cases, lower quality firms well 
informed of their riskiness and have anticipated their low likelihood of acceptance. Second, 
whilst relationship lending helps to bridge the information gap between lenders and borrowers, 
future policies should aim at the financing difficulties of credit-worthy but young firms yet to 
establish good firm-bank relationships or other forms of social capital. In this sense, loan 
guarantee programmes (such as the UK Enterprise Finance Guarantee, EFG, scheme) remain 
an essential tool to increase the supply of funds to small firms. 
There was also an important time dynamic in terms of general patterns in demand and 
discouragement over the recessionary period. Discouragement was higher towards the end of 
the recession, suggesting that initially entrepreneurs anticipated that the supply of loans would 
not diminish too much, and only when it became clear that banks were rationing credit 
persistently did entrepreneurs become disillusioned about applying for loans. An interesting 
feature was that overall loan approval rates were at their lowest between February and June 
  
2009. This implies that entrepreneurs, particularly inexperienced ones, become discouraged 
too late on in the recession, and fail to make applications at precisely the point when banks are 
relaxing their lending criteria. 
The final piece of the jigsaw was to answer the question of whether or not discouraged 
borrowers would have been able to secure a loan if they had actually applied for one. Clearly 
the stock of discouraged borrowers might include both low quality and high quality 
entrepreneurs and firms. If banks can deter low quality borrowers from applying, then this 
reduces both entrepreneur and bank costs of application. But if high quality borrowers are 
deterred from applying, then this represents a loss of value to the bank and the entrepreneur, 
and ultimately the economy. On this question, a prediction for discouraged borrowers that fits 
into a probit model for firms that were approved/denied loans suggests that 55.6% of 
discouraged borrowers would have received a loan had they applied for one. This represents 
around 17,000 loans in total that could have been made. 
5.2. Study Limitations and Future Research 
Whilst this study is unique in that it covered a whole financial crisis and economic 
recession in the UK and benchmarked events against pre-recession year, this presents a 
research opportunity going forward as the economy gradually comes out of recession over the 
next few years to assess the speed at which demand and supply of credit move back into some 
sort of stable equilibrium. It would also add to our knowledge about how commercial banks 
change (tighten or loosen) their lending criteria in response to prevailing economic conditions 
and the process by which this changes entrepreneurs' perceptions about the willingness of banks 
to lend. 
A further avenue of future research would involve understanding how banks become 
aware of discouraged borrowers and how they seek to address this missing market of 
potentially profitable lending. This strand of research could involve detailed case study 
  
interviews with bank lending officers and senior strategists and a more qualitative, survey-
based approach. Both would add to our understanding of the supply-side dynamics of bank 
lending to the entrepreneurial sector. Another issue is whether the specific context of the UK 
credit market, which is characterised by a highly concentrated banking oligopoly, means that 
our findings have wider resonance. Given the disparity in the level of discouragement across 
countries, we might suggest that there are some common characteristics of the UK and 
Canadian credit market that lead to generally lower levels of discouragement, which are not 
present in the US, France or many less developed countries. Further research into the structure 
of credit markets may help us to understand what these key differences are. Our research could 
also benefit from a richer data set including information such balance sheet data (e.g. Cosh et 
al, 2009). Last but not least, this study addresses government policy incentives mainly in the 
form of debt finance, future research that tests the complementarities/trade-offs among 
different sources of capital and/or government interventions (e.g. direct subsidies, public co-
invested venture capital funds) would complete the picture. 
5.3. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we have found that discouraged borrowers represent a particularly 
interesting, and under-researched, yet quantifiably important subset of small businesses. We 
investigated whether or not discouragement is an efficient self-rationing mechanism to screen 
riskier borrowers from the loan market especially during a severe economic downturn, and 
sought to draw out the potential implications for the UK economy. We find that discouraged 
borrowers appear riskier than businesses that choose to apply for bank loans, but they are also 
more informed about their riskiness, hence for many their reluctance to incur loan application 
costs are rational. Our empirical analysis also shows that the financial crisis added noise and 
uncertainty to the lending market and banks responded by placing much more emphases on 
relationships when making their loan decisions. But entrepreneurs also misread the extent of 
  
the reduction in the supply of credit and this potentially led to under-investment in the region 
of £1.5bn per annum over the recessionary cycle from the entrepreneurial sector. It is likely 
that this has resulted in fewer jobs created, lower economic growth and lower profits for banks 
and entrepreneurs. Our findings have important implications on governments’ small business 
policies. However, future studies on this phenomenon are warranted particularly in a non-
recessionary environment. 
 
Appendix: Testing for Over- and Weak-identifying Instruments in the Conditional Probit 
Models 
In order for the Heckman selection model to be properly identified, the selection equation 
must contain at least one variable (exclusion restriction, or instrument) that is not in the 
outcome (main) equation. Ideally in instrumental variable (IV) estimations, a valid instrument 
must be uncorrelated with the regression's disturbances, i.e. exogenous. Moreover, a good 
instrument needs to be strongly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable. If the 
partial correlations between the instruments and the endogenous variable  are weak, the 
coefficient estimates can be biased and hypothesis tests distorted even with a very large sample 
size (Murray, 2006).  
In this study, the model we adopt is in essence a two-stage regression model taking into 
consideration the conditionality, or endogeneity of credit demand and application 
(prob(DEMAND) and prob(APPLY) in the conditional credit application/discouragement and 
credit denial eqation, respectively) using exclusion restrictions in the selection equations as 
instruments. However, testing instrument validity and that they are not weakly identified are 
not so straightforward. In a linear IV regression, Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is 
usually used to assess the validity of instruments (Sargan, 1958), and Stock and Yogo (2005) 
propose a hypothesis test of weak instruments based on the Cragg-Donald (1993) F-statistic. 
  
In order to serve our purpose, we follow Grilli and Murtinu (2014) and run the following 
pseudo-two-stage IV regressions (2SLS) for pre- and within-recession credit application 
(discouragement in the pre-recession specification):  
Second stage: Ai
A
i
AAA XDEMANDDDISCOURAGEAPPLY   210)(or   
First stage: Di
A
i
D
i
D
i
DD XZDEMAND   10  
and credit supply (denial), respectively: 
Second stage: Si
S
i
SSS XAPPLYDENIED   310  
First stage: Ai
S
i
A
i
A
i
AA XZAPPLY   10  
In the peudo-2SLS regressions, Zi
D and Zi
A are vectors of exclusion restrictions used in the 
selection equations in Model 1 and Model 2, respectively, in Tables 3 and 4. In turn, Xi
A and 
Xi
S are vectors of exogenous variable used in the outcome (main) equations in Model 1 and 
Model 2, respectively, in Tables 3 and 4. By definition, Zi
D and Zi
A are the instruments chosen 
in the pseudo-2SLS regressions.  
Table A reports the model diagnostics of the pseudo-two-stage IV regressions for 
APPLY/DISCOURAGED and DEMAND, respectively. For all four models, the sargan tests of 
overidentifying restrictions for the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid cannot be 
rejected. However, if all the instruments share a common rationale so that one invalid 
instrument would invalidate all the others, the Sargan statistics could be biased and inconsistent 
(Murray, 2006; Bascle, 2008). Therefore, we also perform the difference-in-Sargan test for the 
specifications on the exogeneity of individual instruments, and all the tests are passed1. The 
Cragg-Donald F-statistics show that for all but the within-recession pseudo credit denial model 
the null hypothesis that all of the instruments are weak is rejected, where the F-statistics exceed 
the critical value of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock and Yogo, 2005). Since the weak 
                                                 
1 Results available upon request. 
  
instrument test for the within-recession pseudo credit denial function is not passed, we 
undertake further analyses by running an unconditional, multinomial logit model  to check the 
robustness of our main results (Model 3, Table 4). 
"Insert Table A Here" 
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Table 1 
Theory predictions and empirical results for discouraged borrowers 
Study Predicted 
Relationship 
Freel et al 
(2012) 
Cole (2010) 
 
Han et al. 
(2009) 
Bonnet et 
al. (2009) 
Chandler 
(2010) 
Chakravarty 
and Xiang 
(2010) 
Country(s)  UK US US France Canada Brazil, China, 
Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, 
Honduras, 
India, Kenya, 
Pakistan, 
Tanzania, 
Uganda 
Data  Federation 
of Small 
Businesses 
Survey 
US Survey 
of Small 
Business 
Financing 
US Survey 
of Small 
Business 
Financing 
SINE SME 
Financing 
Data 
Initiative 
World Bank, 
Investment 
Climate 
Surveys 
Years  2005 1993, 1998, 
2003 
1998 1997 2004 1997-2001 
Firm Demographic Variables       
Firm Age -ve 0 0/-ve +ve . 0 0 
Firm Size -ve -ve -ve -ve . -ve -ve 
Firm Growth -ve 0 . 0 . . -ve2 
Incorporated -ve +ve . 0 . . . 
Entrepreneur Variables       
Experience -ve -ve 0/+ve 0 . 0 0 
Family owned ? -ve . +ve . . . 
Women 
owned 
-ve 0 0 0 . . -ve 
Ethnic owned -ve - +ve/0 0 . 0 . 
 Creditor Relationship Variables     
Length of 
relationship 
-ve -ve 0/-ve -ve -ve 0 0 
Credit Card -ve . -ve/0 . . . . 
Internet 
Banking 
-ve . . 0 . . . 
Line of Credit +ve . . . -ve . . 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 This study uses country growth rates instead of firm growth rates. 
  
Table 2 
Variable Definition and Sample Descriptive Statistics  
  
(1) Discouraged 
(N = 82) 
 
(2) Applicants 
(N = 721) 
 
(3) Denied 
(N = 218) 
 
(4) Approved 
(N = 503) 
 
(1) vs. 
(2) 
 
(1) vs. 
(3) 
 
(1) vs. 
(4) 
 
(3) vs. 
(4) 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Firm characteristics             
FAMOWN Family-owned business (0, 1) 0.71 0.46 0.64 0.48 0.72 0.45 0.61 0.49    ** 
CORP Firm incorporated (0, 1) 0.72 0.45 0.89 0.31 0.86 0.35 0.90 0.30 *** *** ***  
EMP Number of employees 14.55 28.39 38.95 48.25 30.66 43.10 42.60 49.96 *** *** *** *** 
AGE_11TO20 Firm between 11 and 20 years old (0, 1) 0.42 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.38 0.49    ** 
AGE_20UP Firm more than 20 years old (0, 1) 0.42 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.56 0.50 *  *** *** 
SALE_INCREASE Sales over the past 12 months same increased (0, 1) 0.20 0.40 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.31 0.46 **  **  
SALE_SAME Sales over the past 12 months same as before (0, 1) 0.32 0.50 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.42 * * *  
SALE_DECREASE Sales over the past 12 months same decreased (0, 1) 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.46 0.50     
PROFIT Firm generating profit over the past 12 months (0, 1) 0.22 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.27 0.44     
INNOVATION New product/process innovative to the market (0, 1) 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.20 0.40     
HIGH-TECH High-tech industries defined by Butchard, 1987 (0, 1) 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20  *   
Owner/Entrepreneur characteristics             
WLED Women-led business (0, 1) 0.15 0.36 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 ** * ***  
EXP Owner with prior experience (0, 1) 0.20 0.41 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.23 0.18 0.39  *   
UNIVERSITY Owner with university degree (0, 1) 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.50     
AIMGROW Owner aiming to grow business (0, 1)  0.73 0.45 0.77 0.42 0.76 0.43 0.78 0.42     
Borrower risk indicators             
SOUGHTBEFORE Firm previously sought finance (0, 1) 0.60 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.42 0.50 *** *** *** ** 
IBANKING Firm using internet banking (0, 1) 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.19    * 
RELATION_0 Poor firm-bank relationship (0, 1) 0.34 0.46 0.22 0.41 0.44 0.50 0.12 0.33 * ** *** *** 
RELATION_1 Firm-bank relationship neither good or poor (0, 1) 0.22 0.42 0.16 0.36 0.22 0.42 0.13 0.34 *  ** *** 
RELATION_2 Good firm-bank relationship (0, 1) 0.48 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.34 0.48 0.75 0.43 *** ** *** *** 
MISS_1 Missed overdraft/loan payment once (0, 1) 0.03 0.18 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.28 *    
MISS_2 Missed overdraft/loan payment 2-3 times (0, 1) 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.27    ** 
MISS_3 Missed overdraft/loan payment >3 times (0, 1) 0.20 0.41 0.10 0.29 0.15 0.36 0.07 0.26 ***  *** *** 
NOMISS Never missed overdraft/loan payment (0, 1) 0.65 0.48 0.73 0.44 0.64 0.48 0.77 0.42   *** *** 
Recessionary time indicators             
WAVE1 Dec-08 Barometer Survey firm (0, 1) 0.20 0.41 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34 0.19 0.39  *   
WAVE2/3/4 Feb-/Apr-/Jun-09  Barometer Survey firm (0, 1) 0.01 0.12 0.43 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.49 *** *** *** ** 
WAVE5 Sep-09 Barometer Survey firm (0, 1) 0.28 0.45 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.34 *** ** ***  
WAVE6 Dec-09 Barometer Survey firm (0, 1) 0.35 0.48 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34 *** *** *** ** 
WAVE7 Feb-10 Barometer Survey firm (0, 1) 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35     
* p .10; ** p .05; *** p .01 for univariate comparison test (two-tail test) of difference in means.
Table 3 
Conditional probit regressions: pre-recession results 
  Model 1   Model 2  
 Demand DISCOURAGED Applied Denied 
Variables Coeff. Coeff. dy/dx Coeff. Coeff. dy/dx 
Firm characteristics      
FAMOWN 0.239*** -0.222**  -0.774% 0.220***  -0.152*    -0.293% 
 (0.086)    (0.124)     (0.081)    (0.087)     
CORP -0.047    0.052    0.214% -0.004    0.001    0.059% 
 (0.095)    (0.140)     (0.090)    (0.097)     
EMP 0.022*** -0.017*** -0.046% 0.019*** -0.014*** -0.043% 
 (0.003)    (0.005)     (0.003)    (0.003)     
EMP 2 ('000) -0.093*** 0.064** 0.141% -0.077*** 0.062*** 0.230% 
 (0.018)    (0.030)     (0.017)    (0.016)     
AGE_11TO20 -0.081    -0.196    -1.730% -0.043    0.077    0.780% 
 (0.116)    (0.151)     (0.108)    (0.107)     
AGE_20UP -0.194**  -0.273**   -2.705% -0.134    0.035    0.701% 
 (0.097)    (0.141)     (0.089)    (0.093)     
Construction 0.057    0.025    0.386% 0.049    0.201    3.528% 
(0.142)    (0.241)     (0.139)    (0.197)     
Health&Social Work 0.059    0.263    2.150% 0.054    0.170    3.098% 
(0.176)    (0.270)     (0.170)    (0.225)     
Hotels& Restaurants 0.169    -0.075    -0.046% 0.200    0.263  5.863% 
 (0.172)    (0.275)     (0.166)    (0.215)     
Manufacturing 0.008    0.029    0.245% -0.094    0.120    0.973% 
(0.170)    (0.276)     (0.162)    (0.222)     
Other Services 0.090   0.157    1.473% 0.020    0.026    0.580% 
(0.159)    (0.254)     (0.154)    (0.218)     
Real Estate 0.146    -0.023    -0.353% 0.148    0.102    2.925% 
(0.149)    (0.247)     (0.149)    (0.202)     
Transportation& 
Communication 
0.258    -0.117    -0.064% 0.245    0.068    3.310% 
(0.167)    (0.272)     (0.161)    (0.219)     
Whole Sale/Retail 0.170    -0.372    -2.130% 0.081    0.068    1.785% 
 (0.147)    (0.278)     (0.142)    (0.202)     
South East 0.255 0.039 1.203% 0.162 0.009 1.638% 
 (0.168) (0.244)  (0.153) (0.168)  
South West 0.014 0.371 2.777% -0.014 0.173 2.519% 
 (0.165) (0.234)  (0.155) (0.166)  
East 0.081 -0.127 -0.646% 0.117 -0.248 -2.716% 
 (0.169) (0.285)  (0.161) (0.195)  
East Midlands 0.332* -0.189 -0.196% 0.482** -0.409* -1.822% 
 (0.200) (0.298)  (0.193) (0.215)  
North East -0.120 0.322 1.941% -0.101 0.152 1.392% 
 (0.158) (0.241)  (0.149) (0.167)  
North West 0.115 0.185 1.771% 0.218 -0.059 1.100% 
 (0.167) (0.250)  (0.162) (0.181)  
West Midlands 0.127 -0.001 0.444% 0.136 -0.082 -0.002% 
 (0.165) (0.252)  (0.154) (0.171)  
Yorkshire & Humber -0.073 -0.007 -0.310% 0.011 0.074 1.243% 
 (0.155) (0.270)  (0.148) (0.166)  
Scotland 0.159 0.059 1.003% 0.115 0.018 1.343% 
 (0.168) (0.262)  (0.157) (0.175)  
Wales -0.123 0.313 1.861% -0.121 0.174 1.554% 
 (0.157) (0.242)  (0.148) (0.167)  
Northern Ireland -0.045 -0.307 2.424% 0.011 -0.097 -1.380% 
 (0.160) (0.340)  (0.152) (0.188)  
Owner/Entrepreneur characteristics     
WLED -0.256*** 0.016 0.797% 0.243*** -0.105 -0.641 
 (0.089) (0.144)  (0.084) (0.093)  
EXP 0.001    0.005    0.031% 0.004      
1 
 
 (0.004)    (0.005)     (0.003)      
UNIVERSITY 0.061    -0.276**  -1.811% 0.043    -0.013  0.199% 
 (0.076)    (0.118)     (0.072)    (0.078)     
Borrower risk indicators      
LENGTHRELATION -0.001    -0.004    -0.028% 0.001    -0.013*** -0.211% 
 (0.003)    (0.005)     (0.003)    (0.005)     
Region Effect  Yes   Yes  
N  2,254   1,917  
Censored N  351   13  
Wald 2  61.890***   81.680***  
Log likelihood  -1,042.146   -1,222.074  
2 (  18.280***   67.210***  
* p .10; ** p .05; *** p .01. The firm owner’s perception of the severity of financing problems is used as the exclusion restrictions for 
the regressions but coefficient estimates are not reported to be comparible with the within-recession results (the entrepreneur orientation 
variables are not available in this data set). Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. The base category for sector dummies is 
Agriculture and for region dummies London.
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Table 4 
Within-recession regression results 
 
 
Model 1 
(Probit with selection) 
Model 2 
(Probit with selection) 
Model 3 (mLogit, Base = 
DISCOURAGED) 
 Prob(DEMAND) Prob(APPLY|DEMAND) Prob(APPLY) Prob(DENIED|APPLY) APPROVED DENIED 
Variables Coeff. Coeff. dy/dx Coeff. Coeff. dy/dx Coeff. Coeff. 
Firm characteristics        
FAMOWN 0.137** -0.149 -1.136% -0.067 0.137 4.284% -0.229 0.160    
 (0.058) (0.112)  (0.179) (0.127)  (0.338) (0.360)    
CORP 0.030 0.377*** 7.942% 0.454** 0.028 0.904% 0.866** 0.857**  
 (0.080) (0.130)  (0.214) (0.175)  (0.392) (0.414)    
EMP 0.003*** 0.005** 0.141% 0.020*** -0.002 -0.141% 0.021*** 0.016**  
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.006)    
AGE_11TO20 0.042 0.283 6.991% 0.347 -0.098 -4.710% 0.903* 0.609    
 (0.101) (0.173)  (0.262) (0.201)  (0.489) (0.496)    
AGE_20UP -0.096 0.302* 5.560% 0.337 -0.353* -12.206% 0.920* 0.208    
 (0.101) (0.180)  (0.270) (0.204)  (0.511) (0.521)    
SALE_DECREASE 0.029 -0.059 -0.693% 0.094 -0.182 -5.066% 0.012 -0.304    
 (0.064) (0.141)  (0.215) (0.132)  (0.391) (0.408)    
SALE_SAME -0.110 -0.228 -6.457% -0.227 -0.076 -1.324% -0.578 -0.707    
 (0.072) (0.157)  (0.238) (0.155)  (0.425) (0.450)    
PROFIT -0.003 0.294* 5.823% 0.490** -0.147 -6.181% 1.159*** 0.747*   
 (0.096) (0.158)  (0.228) (0.204)  (0.430) (0.454)    
INNVOATION 0.088 -0.111 -1.044% -0.079 0.044 1.599% -0.247 -0.142    
 (0.066) (0.139)  (0.195) (0.131)  (0.366) (0.377)    
HIGH-TECH -0.091 0.620 11.150% 0.829 0.099 0.270% 1.578 1.695    
 (0.130) (0.493)  (0.647) (0.249)  (1.175) (1.173)    
Metals 
Manufacturing 
-0.198*   0.111 0.417* 11.324% 0.216 0.945    
(0.117)   (0.419) (0.251)  (0.796) (0.861)    
Other 
Manufacturing 
-0.285**   -0.521 0.264 9.080% -0.930 -0.378    
(0.123)   (0.397) (0.275)  (0.743) (0.819)    
Construction -0.252**   -0.397 0.484* 15.281% -0.881 0.166    
 (0.113)   (0.371) (0.248)  (0.702) (0.771)    
Retail & Wholesale -0.012   0.267 0.188 4.301% 0.450 0.760    
(0.138)   (0.474) (0.295)  (0.900) (0.960)    
Transport & 
Communication 
-0.265**   -0.407 0.171 5.897% -0.734 -0.292    
(0.119)   (0.383) (0.262)  (0.723) (0.800)    
Business Services -0.413**   -0.501 -0.140 -1.844% -0.932 -0.975    
(0.164)   (0.559) (0.421)  (1.008) (1.182)    
Other Services -0.196   -0.119 0.270 7.648% -0.149 0.411    
 (0.153)    (0.551) (0.339)  (1.073) (1.138)    
East 0.125 0.188 3.917% 0.207 -0.018 -1.115% 0.446 0.404    
 (0.121) (0.242)  (0.374) (0.251)  (0.736) (0.756)    
London -0.012 -0.343 -8.393% -0.633* 0.416 16.007% -1.326* -0.524    
 (0.132) (0.232)  (0.371) (0.282)  (0.706) (0.719)    
North East 0.182 -0.038 -1.357% 0.030 0.315 9.547% 0.003 0.483    
 (0.149) (0.320)  (0.467) (0.296)  (0.890) (0.910)    
North West 0.063 0.110 2.466% 0.230 0.008 -0.442% 0.423 0.342    
 (0.123) (0.267)  (0.402) (0.261)  (0.770) (0.799)    
South East 0.149 -0.206 -2.115% -0.227 -0.061 -0.934% -0.171 -0.317    
 (0.122) (0.227)  (0.352) (0.253)  (0.674) (0.702)    
South West 0.131 -0.367 -6.197% -0.432 0.023 2.417% -0.597 -0.541    
 (0.120) (0.236)  (0.355) (0.244)  (0.682) (0.712)    
West Midlands 0.015 -0.171 -3.349% -0.340 -0.309 -7.123% -0.393 -1.055    
 (0.146) (0.250)  (0.416) (0.332)  (0.773) (0.851)    
York & Humber 0.199 -0.051 -1.320% -0.211 0.112 4.110% -0.125 -0.064    
 (0.137) (0.287)  (0.419) (0.275)  (0.789) (0.817)    
Wales 0.090 -0.120 -1.142% -0.157 0.083 3.007% -0.153 -0.011    
 (0.122) (0.216)  (0.379) (0.253)  (0.742) (0.764)    
Scotland 0.102 -0.444 -8.884% -0.272 -0.083 -1.374% -0.305 -0.481    
 (0.162) (0.279)  (0.424) (0.342)  (0.796) (0.866)    
Owner/Entrepreneur characteristics       
WLED -0.101 0.104 0.727% 0.028 -0.003 -0.209% 0.008 0.036    
 (0.090) (0.165)  (0.249) (0.193)  (0.454) (0.479)    
EXP -0.171 -1.147** -25.207% -1.852**   -3.620* -2.986    
 (0.201) (0.530)  (0.786)   (1.976) (2.034)    
UNIVERSITY 0.086 -0.335*** -5.539% -0.345** 0.034 2.314% -0.689** -0.562*   
 (0.055) (0.116)  (0.172) (0.114)  (0.322) (0.338)    
AIMGROW 0.239***   0.193   0.286 0.121    
 (0.057)   (0.187)   (0.353) (0.373)    
Borrower risk indicators        
SOUGHTBEFORE -0.521***        
 (0.051)        
IBANKING 0.200 -0.205 -1.401% -0.158 -0.643* -18.266% -0.054 -1.036    
 (0.157) (0.486)  (0.634) (0.379)  (1.152) (1.276)    
RELATIO_1 -0.465*** 0.362** 1.460% -0.055 -0.423*** -15.756% 0.332 -0.353    
 (0.091) (0.153)  (0.223) (0.161)  (0.425) (0.421)    
RELATIO_2 -0.609*** 0.543*** 3.134% 0.229 -1.104*** -38.655% 1.249*** -0.702*   
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(0.075) (0.131)  (0.195) (0.141)  (0.365) (0.371)    
MISS_1 0.591*** 0.167 6.858%      
 (0.116) (0.316)       
MISS_2 0.510*** -0.390** -1.236%      
 (0.108) (0.197)       
MISS_3 0.795*** -0.779*** -6.297% -0.626*** 0.230 9.167% -1.263*** -0.723    
 (0.111) (0.170)  (0.230) (0.177)  (0.439) (0.440)    
Recessionary time indicators       
WAVE2/3/4 -0.289*** 1.981*** 21.869% 2.417*** 0.259 0.203% 4.458*** 4.601*** 
 (0.104) (0.431)  (0.539) (0.227)  (1.130) (1.143)    
WAVE5 -0.085 -0.139 -7.185% -0.341 0.296 11.862% -0.931** -0.238    
 (0.094) (0.173)  (0.234) (0.196)  (0.452) (0.481)    
WAVE6 -0.160 0.003 -3.797% -0.157 -0.214 -4.886% -0.220 -0.482    
 (0.117) (0.194)  (0.278) (0.249)  (0.516) (0.561)    
WAVE7 0.007 1.214** 22.308% 1.880** -0.137 -10.297% 3.865* 2.911    
 (0.228) (0.534)  (0.814) (0.245)  (2.007) (2.080)    
N  3089   803  803 
Censored N  2286   82  - 
Wald 2  122.60***  120.31*** 337.13*** 
Log likelihood  -1,738.634  -535.301 -538.058 
2 (  14.27***   2.80*  - 
* p .10; ** p .05; *** p .01. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. The base category for sector dummies is Agriculture and 
for region dummies East Midlands. 
 
 
 
Table A 
Pseudo-two-stage IV Regression Model Diagnostics 
 Pre-recession Within-recession 
 DISCOURAGED DENIED APPLY DENIED 
Sargan 2 (p-value) 1.563 (0.211) 2.408 (0.121) 11.796 (0.161) 1.648 (0.949) 
Cragg-Donald F-statistics 44.488 32.946 14.511 3.285 
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Alternative Specifications with REGION as identifying restrictions for Table 4: 
 
 Prob(DEMAND) Prob(APPLY|DEMAND) Prob(APPLY) Prob(DENIED|APPLY) 
Variables Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Firm characteristics    
FAMOWN 0.134** -0.153 -0.156 0.101 
 (0.058) (0.117) (0.178) (0.124) 
CORP 0.024 0.302** 0.561*** 0.069 
 (0.080) (0.134) (0.212) (0.174) 
EMP 0.003*** 0.006** 0.009*** -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
AGE_11TO20 0.040 0.190 0.350 -0.087 
 (0.101) (0.171) (0.261) (0.205) 
AGE_20UP -0.096 0.226 0.359 -0.357* 
 (0.101) (0.180) (0.268) (0.210) 
SALE_DECREASE 0.032 -0.112 0.074 -0.165 
 (0.064) (0.146) (0.222) (0.132) 
SALE_SAME -0.109 -0.228 -0.242 -0.057 
 (0.072) (0.158) (0.245) (0.157) 
PROFIT -0.006 0.371** 0.463** -0.092 
 (0.096) (0.164) (0.231) (0.203) 
Metals Manufacturing -0.218* 0.187 0.196 0.423* 
(0.119) (0.318) (0.413) (0.243) 
Other Manufacturing -0.252** -0.290 -0.462 0.200 
(0.127) (0.304) (0.397) (0.272) 
Construction -0.225* -0.238 -0.313 0.487** 
 (0.117) (0.288) (0.373) (0.245) 
Retail & Wholesale -0.036 0.085 0.327 0.199 
(0.143) (0.359) (0.470) (0.289) 
Transport & Communication -0.252** -0.206 -0.284 0.181 
(0.122) (0.295) (0.378) (0.255) 
Business Services -0.383** -0.320 -0.444 -0.119 
(0.170) (0.374) (0.563) (0.420) 
Other Services -0.219 0.271 -0.005 0.284 
 (0.162) (0.397) (0.551) (0.337) 
INNOVATION 0.082 -0.140 -0.075 0.038 
 (0.066) (0.141) (0.193) (0.129) 
East 0.128  0.184  
 (0.117)  (0.366)  
London -0.073  -0.746**  
 (0.128)  (0.371)  
North East 0.167  -0.081  
 (0.144)  (0.474)  
North West 0.070  0.141  
 (0.119)  (0.388)  
South East 0.128  -0.217  
 (0.117)  (0.343)  
South West 0.090  -0.476  
 (0.117)  (0.347)  
West Midlands 0.009  -0.309  
 (0.141)  (0.400)  
York & Humber 0.197  -0.263  
 (0.132)  (0.410)  
Wales 0.069  -0.131  
 (0.117)  (0.372)  
Scotland 0.041  -0.232  
 (0.159)  (0.414)  
Owner/Entrepreneur characteristics   
WLED -0.100 0.110 0.022 0.019 
 (0.090) (0.157) (0.247) (0.191) 
EXP -0.169 -0.908* -1.941** 0.284 
 (0.200) (0.498) (0.788) (0.436) 
UNIVERSITY 0.086 -0.323*** -0.345** 0.044 
 (0.055) (0.124) (0.170) (0.113) 
AIMGROW 0.248*** -0.038 0.165 -0.095 
 (0.061) (0.128) (0.188) (0.133) 
Borrower risk indicators    
SOUGHTBEFORE -0.524*** 0.004   
 (0.053) (0.108)   
IBANKING 0.197 -0.239 -0.242 -0.644* 
 (0.157) (0.465) (0.607) (0.366) 
RELATIO_1 -0.477*** 0.313** -0.074 -0.383** 
 (0.091) (0.147) (0.226) (0.160) 
RELATIO_2 -0.617*** 0.491*** 0.181 -1.084*** 
 (0.075) (0.129) (0.198) (0.143) 
MISS_1 0.590*** 0.213 0.546 0.126 
 (0.116) (0.325) (0.397) (0.200) 
MISS_2 0.502*** -0.364* 0.011 0.126 
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 (0.108) (0.198) (0.275) (0.180) 
MISS_3 0.775*** -0.764*** -0.573** 0.244 
 (0.111) (0.179) (0.231) (0.176) 
Recessionary time indicators   
WAVE2/3/4 -0.294*** 1.918*** 2.394*** 0.290 
 (0.104) (0.392) (0.551) (0.227) 
WAVE5 -0.088 -0.155 -0.373 0.257 
 (0.093) (0.168) (0.232) (0.192) 
WAVE6 -0.165 0.054 -0.163 -0.168 
 (0.118) (0.200) (0.273) (0.243) 
WAVE7 -0.007 1.072** 1.953** -0.385 
 (0.227) (0.506) (0.830) (0.507) 
N  3089  803 
Censored N  2286  82 
Wald 2  114.42***  114.91*** 
Log likelihood  -1,740.231  -541.255 
2 (  5.17**  3.15* 
 
 
